A painting by Australian aviation artist Ray Honisett depicting No. 1
Squadron Lincolns on a low-level bombing run over the Malayan jungle in 1957.
By that stage in the conflict the Commonwealth air campaign consisted largely
of attacking suspected guerrilla positions in the remote northern areas of
Malaya. [AWM ART27684]
Arriving in Malaya in July 1950, just one month after the
Dakotas of No. 38 Squadron, the six Lincoln aircraft of No. 1 Squadron RAAF
were the only heavy bombers in the area until 1953 when they were joined by
some RAF Lincolns. The Australian Lincolns were therefore the mainstay of the
Commonwealth bombing campaign, especially in the early years of the conflict
when the outcome was still in doubt.
From 1950 to 1958 No. 1 Squadron flew 4,000 missions in
Malaya. The squadron flew both pinpoint-bombing and area-bombing missions as
well as night harassment raids – flying among many targets but only dropping
bombs occasionally – in the manner of the RAF “siren raids” of the Second World
War.
Operation Termite in July 1954 was a high point of the
squadron’s service in Malaya. Five Australian Lincolns and six Lincolns from
No. 148 Squadron RAF took part in this operation against guerrilla camps in
Northern Malaya. The Lincolns carried out a series of bombing runs and ground
attacks in conjunction with paratroop drops.
The long range and heavy payload of the Lincoln made it an
effective bomber, while its relatively slow speed proved advantageous in Malaya
when trying to locate jungle targets.
Although the fighting was largely over when they arrived in
1958, the Canberra bombers of No. 2 Squadron flew some missions from
Butterworth including formation-bombing runs. The Sabre jet fighters of No. 3
Squadron and No. 77 Squadron also flew strafing missions from Butterworth
against Communist-guerrilla targets.
#
Elsewhere, however, the British made a major attempt to
maintain their imperial position. The surrender of Japan was followed by the
reimposition of control in occupied areas, including Malaya, Singapore and Hong
Kong, and, from 1948, a serious effort was made to resist a Communist
insurrection in the economically crucial colony of Malaya. In what was termed
the Malayan Emergency, the British initially failed to devise an effective
strategy, but this changed with the development of successful, and intertwined,
military and political plans. ‘Hearts and minds’ policies restricted the appeal
of the Malayan Communist Party, which was largely based in the minority Chinese
population, although these policies also relied on the ability to coerce. Local
economic growth, which benefited greatly from the Korean War, also helped.
British effectiveness owed much to the use of helicopters and transport
aircraft; to improvements in their intelligence system; and to the use of
counter-insurgency forces skilled in jungle craft and understanding of the
local situation. Rather than requiring protection, a problem with
force-deployment in many counter-insurgency struggles, such forces could take
the war to the guerrillas. This was complemented by steps to control the
population that included the careful supervision of food supplies and the
resettlement of much of the rural population, a crucial move. British
assistance to the Greek army in the Greek civil war had played a role in the
evolution of British experience with counterinsurgency operations.
Partly due to Malaya’s geographical isolation, and certainly
to the absence of a neighbouring Communist state, the Communists lacked
adequate Chinese or Soviet support; they also failed to create a parallel
system of government, while the British did not allow the Emergency to deter
them from their political course: moves towards self-government (1955) and
independence (1957), which the British saw as the best way to defeat the
Communists. On the local level, there was a parallel move toward normality,
with pacified areas benefiting from an easing of the emergency regulations.
Having largely beaten the insurgents by 1954, the British
maintained the pressure over the following years, in particular by the
effective use of the now well-developed intelligence apparatus, further
weakening the Communists, and were rewarded with mass surrenders in December
1957. In the 1960s, British success in Malaya was to be contrasted with American
failure in Vietnam. The contrast frequently focused on greater British
commitment to, and skill in, ‘hearts and minds’ policies, and on the
deficiencies of the American stress on firepower. While this was correct, the situation facing
the Americans in Vietnam, in terms both of the political situation there and of
the international context, was more difficult.
No comments:
Post a Comment