RT-23UTTKh Molodets (SS-24 Scalpel Mod.1)
Alternative Basing Schemes
Although most of their ICBMs were always sited in silos,
both the USA and the USSR repeatedly examined alternatives, both to increase
survivability and, perhaps of greater importance in the USA than in the USSR,
to reduce costs. In the USA, environmental factors also became an increasingly
important consideration.
One of the US schemes was called Multiple Protective
Structures (MPS) and consisted of a number of ‘racetracks’, each about 45 km in
circumference and equipped with twenty-three hardened shelters. One mobile
ICBM, mounted on a large wheeled TEL, would have moved around each racetrack at
night in a random fashion, with decoy TELs and missiles adding to the
adversary’s uncertainties. Basic MPS involved 200 missiles moving between 4,600
shelters covering an area of some 12,800 km2, but a more grandiose version
envisaged 300 missiles moving around 8,500 shelters.
An enhanced version of MPS was proposed in the early 1980s,
in which a new Small ICBM (SICBM) would have been deployed in fixed, hardened
silos distributed randomly among the 200 racetracks of the MPS system, thus
adding to the aiming points for the Soviet ICBM force. It was intended that the
SICBM would be 11.6 m long and weigh 9,980 kg, have a range of 12,000 km, and
carry a single 500 kT warhead; it would have been launched by an airborne
launch-control centre. SICBM would have been housed in a tight-fitting
container placed in a vertical silo hardened to approximately 530 kgfcm2, and
it would have required an exceptionally accurate incoming warhead to destroy
such a target. Various other launch methods were also considered for SICBM,
including a road vehicle, normal silos, airborne launch from a transport
aircraft, and (possibly the only time this was ever considered for an ICBM) from
a helicopter.
Another scheme was based on the racetrack principle of MPS,
but this time with the TELs running inside shallow tunnels, 4 m in diameter.
The TELs would simply have kept moving, thus avoiding the need for shelters,
and would have had large plugs fore and aft to protect against nuclear blast
within the tunnel. If required to launch, the TEL would have halted and used
hydraulic jacks to drive the armoured roof upwards, breaking through the
surface until the missile was raised to the vertical.
Deep Basing (DB) involved placing the ICBMs either singly or
in groups deep underground, where they would ride out an attack and then emerge
to carry out a retaliatory strike. One of the major DB schemes was the ‘mesa
concept’, in which the missiles, crews and equipment were to be placed in
interconnecting tunnels some 760–915 m deep under a mesa or similar geological
formation.
Following an enemy nuclear strike, the crews would have used special
machines to dig a tunnel to the surface and then brought the launcher to the
open to initiate a retaliatory strike. This scheme’s disadvantage lay in its
poor reaction time and the difficulty it posed for arms-control verification.
From the practical point of view it would have been necessary to find rock
which was both fault-free and sufficiently strong to resist a Soviet nuclear
attack, but which could nevertheless be drilled through in an acceptable time
and without the machinery becoming jammed by debris. On top of all that, a
second incoming nuclear strike when the drilling machine was near to the
surface would have caused irreparable damage. A related project (Project
Brimstone) examined existing deep mines, but also proved unworkable.
A totally different approach, known as Closely Based Spacing
or ‘Dense Pack’, was also considered. This suggested that, instead of spacing
missile silos sufficiently far apart to ensure that not more than one could be
destroyed by one incoming warhead, 100 MX missiles should be sited in
superhardened silos placed deliberately close together. The idea was that this
would take advantage of the ‘fratricide’ effect in which incoming warheads
would be deflected or destroyed by the nuclear explosions of the previous
warheads. A spacing of the order of 550 m was suggested, and it was claimed
that in such a scheme between 50 and 70 per cent of the ICBMs would have
survived.
Mobile basing
All the basing methods discussed above were either static or
involved limited movement in a closed circuit, but the question of mobile
basing was often considered as well. As described earlier, the German A-4 was
designed as a road-mobile system, but an alternative rail-based option was also
considered, and a similar scheme was designed and tested during the development
phase of the Minuteman I. The plan was to have fifty trains, each of some
fourteen vehicles, which would have included up to five TEL cars, each carrying
a single missile, together with command-and-control, living-accommodation, and
power facilities. The scheme was examined in great detail, and a prototype
‘Mobile Minuteman’ train was tested on the public railway. Although the scheme
proved feasible, it was dropped in favour of silo deployment.
A similar proposal was considered during the long
development of the Peacekeeper (MX) system, and very nearly became operational.
This version would have consisted of twenty-five missile trains, each carrying
two missiles. Each train would have consisted of the locomotive and six cars:
two missile launch cars; a launch-control car, a maintenance car, and two
security cars. In peacetime the trains would have been located in a ‘rail
garrison’ sited on an existing Strategic Air Command base, which would have
contained four or five shelters (known as ‘igloos’), each housing one train.
These garrisons would each have covered an area of some 18–20 hectares, with
tracks leading to the USA’s 240,000 km national rail network. On receipt of
strategic warning the trains would have deployed on to this national network,
where they would have rapidly attained a high degree of survivability. This
scheme was under active development from 1989 until its cancellation in 1991.
As we have seen, the Soviet SS-24 Mod 1 was actually fielded
in the rail-mobile mode. There were three rail garrisons, all in Russia, with
four trains at two sites and three trains at the third. The trains had one
launcher each, with two further cars for launch control, maintenance, and power
supply.
The Soviets also fielded a road-mobile ICBM, the SS-25,
which was also the last Soviet ICBM to enter service during the Cold War. This
single-warhead missile was carried on a fourteen-wheeled TEL, which was raised
on jacks for stability during the launch. The TEL and its missile were normally
housed in a garage with a sliding roof which would be opened for an emergency
launch. Given the necessary warning, however, the TELs deployed to pre-surveyed
sites in forests.
One US proposal was the ‘continuous patrol aircraft’, in
which a packaged missile was carried inside a large, fuel-efficient aircraft.
On receipt of verified launch instructions, the missile would have been
extracted by a drogue parachute, and once it was descending vertically its
engine would have fired automatically, enabling the missile to climb away on a
normal trajectory. Tests were carried out using a Minuteman I missile
transported by a C-5 Galaxy and were completely successful. Large numbers of
aircraft would have been needed to maintain the number required on simultaneous
patrol. It would have been very difficult for a potential enemy to track them
and even more difficult to guarantee the destruction of every airborne aircraft
in a pre-emptive strike, but the main weaknesses of the scheme were the
vulnerability of the airfields, the enormous operating costs, and, to a lesser
degree, the decreased accuracy of the missile.
Brings a tear to my eye every-time I watch it. WE THE PEOPLE are not the enemies.
ReplyDeleteBe on the right side of history my brothers!
https://youtu.be/fGSBcslwDww
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Budw7PggqJg