The U.S. Army emerged from World War II as the best-armed,
most-mobile, best-equipped, best-supplied, most-educated, and highest-paid army
in history. Immediately following the end of the war, President Harry S. Truman
supported a measured reduction from 8.2 million to 1.5 million men, but
domestic political pressures resulted in an army drawdown to fewer than 591,000
personnel in ten divisions and five regiments by June 1950. The 1947 National
Security Act, designed to unify the nation’s armed forces and decrease
interservice rivalries, established the U.S. Air Force as independent from the
army and designated the army as having primary responsibility for land-based
operations.
Despite streamlining of command structure in the late 1940s,
low budgets contributed to a dramatic decline in army combat effectiveness. By
1950, few of the army’s ten divisions were fully capable of deployment outside
the continental United States. Four understrength, poorly trained, and
inadequately equipped divisions were in occupation in Japan, while 80,000 men
were in Germany.
The Korean War began in June 1950. American advisors and
troops rushed from Japan helped purchase just enough time to prevent Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) forces from completely
overrunning the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) before substantial forces
could be sent from the United States. This also presented serious difficulties,
as the army was stretched thin trying to keep up its guard in Europe with the
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.
The war revealed the appalling state of the U.S. military,
especially the army, which had undergone major cutbacks under Defense Secretary
Louis Johnson, who favored the air force over both the army and navy. Troops
were often sent into combat without proper training, and equipment was both
obsolete and inadequate. The buildup in Korea was made possible only by calling
up reserve and National Guard units, which also had the effect of securing
experienced combat veterans. Most of the weaponry employed by the army in Korea
was of World War II vintage.
Massive U.S. artillery fire and airpower helped to offset
Chinese numbers. The war also saw the army carry out extensive experimentation
with the helicopter for medical evacuation but also for resupply and the
movement of troops. In addition, the war speeded up desegregation of the army.
During the conflict, the defense budget quadrupled, and the army grew
dramatically in size. By 1953, army strength stood at twenty divisions and
eighteen regiments with a total of 1.5 million personnel. The Korean War also
acted as a stimulus to research and development programs, which brought new
weapons into the field in the latter 1950s and early 1960s, and ensured that
the United States maintained a significant military establishment. After every
previous conflict, the United States had largely disarmed.
With an armistice in Korea in July 1953, the new administration
of President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to shift emphasis to nuclear
deterrence in the so-called New Look policy (popularly known as “more bang for
the buck”). By 1958, army strength had again decreased, this time to fifteen
divisions. Under the New Look, the army prepared to use flexible but shortrange
nuclear munitions to offset the greater manpower of potential enemies in Europe
and Asia. In the mid-1950s, the army developed the Jupiter and Nike missiles as
well as artillery systems capable of firing nuclear munitions. In order to
increase survivability and mobility on nuclear battlefields, the army
introduced the M41, M47, and M48 tanks, reestablishing four armored divisions
by 1956.
Structurally, because nuclear weapons could easily destroy
concentrated groups of soldiers, the army reorganized its units into
decentralized and autonomous pentomic divisions, consisting of five battle
groups, that could operate independently or join together to provide mass and
firepower. By 1958, the army had divided all of its infantry and airborne
divisions into pentomic structures.
In the early 1960s, political events in Latin America as
well as the Berlin Crises and the Cuban Missile Crisis intensified the Cold
War. President John F. Kennedy’s administration became concerned with combating
the domino effect of encroaching communism while providing a more balanced
approach to military threats. This strategy, known as flexible response, called
for an increase in the army’s conventional force structure to provide a
nonnuclear response to future threats. It also emphasized counterinsurgency
warfare.
In the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
spearheaded a wholesale reorganization of the army that consolidated redundant
structures and decreased inefficiencies. Largely due to previous programs
coming to fruition, the army received the M60 machine gun and the M60 tank and
replaced its outdated M-1 Garand rifle with the M-14 and a few years later the
M-16. The army also abandoned the pentomic division structure and established
traditional three-brigade Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROADs),
including mechanized divisions equipped with the M113 armored personnel
carrier. While the army’s doctrine for its ROADs centered on fighting in
nonnuclear battlefields, its primary focus remained linear battles in the
European theater.
As the Soviet Union and the United States approached nuclear
parity, however, the army also began to prepare to counter a newly emerging
threat of guerrilla-style communist insurgencies. In 1961, Kennedy
significantly increased the size and scope of Special Forces units for
counterinsurgency operations. Special Forces soldiers became expert in the
tactics, techniques, and procedures of both defeating guerrilla movements and
training indigenous soldiers, particularly as special advisors in Vietnam.
America’s involvement in Vietnam, which had begun with
support for the French in the Indochina War (1946–1954), rapidly escalated with
the renewal of the insurgency in the late 1950s. President Kennedy sent only
advisors and helicopters, but in mid-1965 his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson,
introduced U.S. ground troops. The war gradually escalated, and at peak
strength in early 1969 the United States had 543,400 men in Vietnam.
For the U.S. Army, the Vietnam War meant adapting to an
assortment of new challenges. Enemy force capabilities ranged from squad-sized
local Viet Cong units employing guerrilla tactics to well-trained North
Vietnamese Army regiments and divisions supported by conventional artillery
assets. The enemy could slip into local population centers and the jungle
underbrush, which made locating him difficult. Additionally, enemy forces often
compensated for their comparative lack of firepower by fighting at night and
establishing well-placed ambushes, booby traps, and mines.
The army adapted to these challenges by employing a mixture
of new tactics and new weapon systems to fight in this nonlinear battlefield.
The Vietnam War also saw the United States make extensive use of the
helicopter, and in August 1965 it introduced in Vietnam the 1st Air Cavalry
Division, which was entirely air mobile. Helicopter operations significantly
improved the ability to mass, reinforce, and withdraw forces if necessary in
remote areas not easily accessible to ground transportation.
Despite the army’s overwhelming success in pitched battles
with North Vietnamese regulars, the United States failed to secure victory in
Vietnam. It had concentrated on big-unit actions and body counts rather than on
pacification programs as measurements of success.
The army emerged from Vietnam in terrible condition. The war
exacted a shocking toll on both discipline and morale. Racial problems abounded
as did insubordination, and a general permissiveness led to careerism or
“ticket-punching” among the officer corps and an abrogation of authority by
noncommissioned officers. During the mid-1970s, all branches of the armed
services, but particularly the army, suffered from underfunding and
congressional and executive neglect.
The army sought an all-volunteer force. Its Volunteer Army
Project (VOLAR), begun in 1970, received President Richard Nixon’s warm
support. He embraced the plan as a means of ending middle-class opposition to
his Vietnam War policies, and he abolished the draft in 1973. The U.S. armed
forces, including the army, became all-volunteer.
Recruiting standards were upgraded, and discharge programs
helped to rid the army of drug users and those unsuited for military life. In
1975 the army insisted on a high school diploma for its recruits. It also began
a massive educational program to eradicate perceived and actual racial
discrimination. The number of African American officers increased, and
promotion boards ensured that minorities were promoted equally based on
percentages of numbers of those serving. Other initiatives such as barracks
renovation and involving enlisted men by seeking their ideas on how to improve
quality of life ended many irritants of the draft era. Another major change was
allowing women increased opportunities in occupational specialties, although
supposedly not in combat units. Army chief of staff General Creighton Abrams
(1972–1974) and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (1969–1974) also did much to
create a total force policy that restructured the entire army to make it
impossible for political leaders to commit the army to war without mobilizing
its reserve components. This was successively the case in the Persian Gulf War,
the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
As the Vietnam War faded, the army refocused its attention
on what had always been considered the most significant threat: a potential
Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War convinced
U.S. Army leaders that new advances in the lethality of tank munitions,
artillery, and wire-guided antitank weapons created dramatic advantages for
defenders in a conventional mechanized war. Technologically, these new advances
required the army to modernize its antiquated equipment and develop a new tank,
infantry fighting vehicle, and helicopter. Doctrinally, in 1976 the army
emphasized establishing an active defense policy, an elastic strategy comprised
of battle positions organized in depth that focused on firepower and attrition.
It was not until the advent in 1981 of President Ronald
Reagan’s administration, which focused on directly confronting Soviet
capabilities in Europe, that the army received full modernization funding. The
M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, supported by the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle,
became the basis of maneuver warfare. In 1982, under the direction of General
Donn Starry, the army adopted the AirLand Battle doctrine. Designed to deter
the Soviet Union, AirLand Battle revolutionized army doctrine by shifting
emphasis from defensive to offense operations and employing maneuver warfare
that involved coordination of joint forces, especially close air support. Units
would train to strike hard and fast to disrupt and attack the enemy’s critical
second-echelon forces. The U.S. Army proved the effectiveness of its training,
doctrine, and equipment-modernization efforts shortly after the Cold War ended
during the one hundred–hour ground offensive against Iraq in the 1991 Persian
Gulf War.
At the end of the Cold War in 1991, U.S. Army strength stood
at 739,594 active duty and close to 1.085 million Army Reserve and National
Guard personnel.
References Bacevich, A. J. The Pentomic Era: The US Army
between Korea and Vietnam.Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
1986. Connor, Arthur W., Jr. The Army and Transformation, 1945–1991:
Implications for Today. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002.
Romjue, John L. The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army. Fort
Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 1993. ———. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of
Army Doctrine, 1973– 1982. Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, 1984. Rose, John P. The Evolution of U.S. Army
Nuclear Doctrine, 1945–1980. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980. Weigley, Russell F.
History of the United States Army. Enlarged ed. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1984.
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