SOVIET FIGHTER ACES IN KOREA

Russian MiG-15 Aces in Korea, from left to right: Aleksandr P. Smorchkov (8 kills), Nikolai Ivanovich Ivanov (6), Semen Alexeievich Fedorets (8), Yevgeni G. Pepelyayev (19) and Sergei Makarovich Kramarenko (13).

On Sunday, June 25, 1950, the North Korean Peoples Army suddenly launched its invasion of South Korea by crossing the 38th Parallel. Spearheaded by T-34/85 tanks and supported by swarms of 11- 10 Shturmovik ground-attack aircraft, the offensive rapidly pushed South Korean and UN troops back.

USAF F-80s, F-5 1 s, F-82s, and B-26s were quickly in the fray, wreaking successful havoc on Communist supply lines, and some big scores were built up against obsolescent Russian- built piston-engined aircraft; as the tide of war was beginning to turn and the North Korean advance slowed down to a halt, the advent of the Mikoyan-Guryevich MiG-15 mid-wing monoplane jets came to the Allies as one of the nastiest surprises of the war.

On November 1, 1950, UN pilots submitted first sighting reports of MiG- 15s in Korean colors and, although 12 days later the first victory was reported, it soon became very obvious that the F-80s, F-84s, and Meteors had at a stroke become obsolete. The MiGs could even outclimb the F-86s that entered combat in December, 1950, and enjoying an untouchable ceiling of 15,200 meters, they could dive down on their prey and climb back up to a safe position after striking with relative impunity. From their experience Russian pilots determined that the MiG's main strength though lay in its enormous firepower, offered by one N-37 37mm cannon and two NS-23KM 23 mm cannon. A two-second burst would pour a devastating 14 kilograms of lead into the enemy plane, tearing it to pieces, while the MiG could take a lot of punishment from the Sabres' .50 caliber guns thanks to its heavier armor protection.

United States military authorities have always felt certain that skilled Soviet airmen fought in Korea. The actual Soviet involvement has long been due to continuous Soviet attempts to hide their participation at all. Glasnost and Perestrojka as late as 1993 have laid Open fragments of Russian files, allow allowing to make a fairer comparison of the history of aerial warfare. Although there are many Russian participants who are still reluctant to talk freely about their experiences, there is no more denying that the combatants in Korea in terms of technical and psychological quality were actually more evenly matched, and that UN estimates of their air-to-air losses were grossly underestimated.

The VVS posted its 64 IAK on secret mission to Korea primarily tasked with blunting the Allied air offensive against the north. It was comprised of some elite fighter divisions which were rotated in and out after six to twelve months of combat. Commanding officer at its peak was General Major G.A. Lobov, late of the crack 7 GIAD of World War I1 fame with I9 air victories to his credit, who was destined to add four more kills to his already distinguished record in the ferocious air battles fought over Korea. In 1952 the 64 IAK commanded three fighter air divisions along with two antiaircraft divisions (85mm and 57mm guns), having a total of 26,000 men in strength. Recent information from Russia reveals that a total of 10 fighter divisions were committed to action in Korea at one time or another. The following units have been traced so far:

32 IAD

913 IAP

151 IAD

29 GIAP

216 IAD

518 IAP

303 IAD

18 GIAP,

523 IAP,

17 IAP

304 IAD

324 IAD

176 GIAP,

196 IAP

As the Soviet Air Force was undergoing a complete transformation in modern equipment, units were deployed not uniformly prepared, some containing a relative proportion of pilots with an all too brief training period on jets; the tough veterans of the Patriotic War, however, formed the bulk and guts of the Soviet fighter force in Korea. They devised tactics under combat conditions that put the good qualities of the MiG to best advantage. In fact, the aircraft itself was confidence-inspiring, as it proved a clear ascendancy in many respects over the best enemy fighter, the F-86.

For fear of Soviet airmen falling into enemy hands, orders were given that prohibited pilots from penetrating a restricted area 100 kilometers wide north of the 38th Parallel, and from flying over coastal areas with the risk of imminent enemy naval vessels. Some Russians said that American pilots were quick to make good use of these restrictions when things were beginning to become too rough, running for the safety of these areas.

One of the first divisions to become operational was the 324 IAD under the high caliber leadership of the legendary Ivan Kozhedub, the Allied ace of aces of World War I1 with 62 kills. The unit had distinguished itself against the Luftwaffe during the so-called Svir-Petrozavodsk campaign (June-August, 1944) and was now tasked with neutralizing the Allied bombing campaign against North Korea, producing six more Heroes of the Soviet Union, the highest Soviet military distinction; whereas Kozhedub did not see any combat in Korea, his deputy, Vitalij Ivanovich Popkov, did. Popkov, a brilliant pilot and able tactician with 41 air victories against the Luftwaffe, went off whenever the opportunity arose, reporting the destruction of three more enemy planes in the skies above Korea.

On September 19, 1950, well before the first MiG-sightings were reported by the Allies, Podpolkovnik Aleksandr Karasyov, another notable fighter ace of World War 11 with 30 kills, again proved his attributes by flaming three F-84 Thunderjets in quick succession. On December 24 Kapitan Stepan Naumenko of the crack 29 GIAP had the distinction of becoming the first Soviet fighter ace in Korea by scoring his 5th air victory.

Aggressive, flying a formidable fighting machine and almost always enjoying the advantage of height, the Russians in time enjoyed moments of glory in their principal function of stopping the B-29s from systematically bombing North Korean industries, airfields, and bridges. On April 12, 195 1, 48 B-29s were ordered off to strike the railroad bridges at Andong and Sinuiju, but 36 MiGs rose to engage them and claimed to have knocked down nine heavies, while the Americans admitted the loss of three of their number with seven more sustaining damage. On May 20 Starshij Lejtenant Fyodor Shabanov became the first fighter pilot in history to destroy five jets in air combat when he forced down an F-86 to bring his tally to six - five against jets - tying him with the American Jim Jabara of the 335th FIS, who, by coincidence, racked up his fifth and sixth victories that same day.

The MiGs appeared in increasing numbers as the war wore on, with poorly trained Chinese and North Korean units entering the fray, only to be whittled down by the battle-hardened Sabre pilots. The Allied fighters, though, again fared badly engaging Soviet MiGs on September 10, when the 64 IAK submitted claims for five F-86s, five F-84s, and one each F-80 and Gloster Meteor, all without loss; Kapitan G.I. Ges, an ace with five kills in World War 11, accounted for the Meteor. Two weeks later, on September 26, Starshij Lejtenant N.V. Sutyagin claimed another of these to raise his bag to nine as the 303 and 324 IADs were claiming a total of four F-86s, three F-84s, and two Meteors, again without loss. In fact, the Soviet fighter elite in Korea considered the Americans less aggressive and flexible when met on equal terms, and lagging behind in fighting morale considering them unmotivated, fighting without cause.

The B-29s took another terrible battering on October 23. This time the MiGs were really ready. 56 fighters were put into the air during the raid, 12 of which were kept in reserve to intercept any bombers that might break through. 44 relentlessly attacked the bombers, 12 of these being claimed destroyed despite an escort of 55 F-84s, four of the Thunderjets also being knocked down. One MiG fell victim to the screening force of 34 F-86s over North Korean territory. As is so often the case, accounts from the opposing sides vary, and the exact figures are a matter of dispute. Whatever the truth, the B-29s were relegated to night raids following their heavy losses.

The hopelessly inferior Meteors were again meat on the table on December 1, 195 1, when the glorious 176 GTAP got into its last scrap with the Australians, coming away with nine kills. Kapitan S.M. Krarnarenko was high-scorer that day with a double, while singles were turned in by Podpolkovnik S.F. Vishnyakov, Major S.P. Subbotin, Kapitan A.F. Vasko, who was a 15-victory in World War 11, Starshij Lejtenant F.A. Zubakin, P.S. Milaushkin, A.F. Golovachyov, and 1.N.Gulyj.

The number one jet ace of all time is squadron leader Kapitan Nikolaj Sutyagin. He went to war as a deputy squadron leader with the 17 IAP and claimed his first success on June 19, 195 1. Three days later he was able to bring his tally to three with two F-86s. He continued to chalk up victories on a regular basis and excelled in December, 195 1, reporting the destruction of five enemy planes in the air. He finished with a confirmed total of 22 kills during 149 sorties, his score running as follows: 15 F-86s, three F-84s, two F- 80s, and two Meteors.

The runner-up was the highly talented commander of the 196 IAP, Polkovnik Yevgenij Pepelyaev, whose score is quoted by some sources as 23, although this is considered a combined total of his personal victories and shares. Pepelyaev required only 108 sorties to amass his impressive score of 19 kills, all of which were achieved against jets: 14 Sabres, two F-84s, one F-94, and one F-80. He also made a distinguished record as leader of the regiment, which finished the conflict as one of the top-scorers with 100 air victories against 24 aircraft and five pilots lost to enemy action during the period of April, 195 1 to February, 1952. Among stellar performers in Korea was Major Dmitrij Oskin, who scored a string of eight victories in 23 days of combat between October-December, 1951 and wound up as an ace with 15 confirmed kills. Major S.A. Bakhayev is credited with 11 victories in Korea and one RB-29 intruder during the cold war period on December 29, 1950, while serving with the 523 IAP.

The Korean War produced 51 Russian fighter aces scoring five or more confirmed air victories; numerous other pilots made acedom by combining their World War II bag with credits in Korea. The 303 IAD boasted a total of 12 Heroes of the Soviet Union in MiG- 15s.

The war ended on July 27, 1953. Total losses are a matter of dispute. Material disclosed by the VVS General Staff in 1993 indicates that the 64 IAK was credited with downing 1,106 enemy aircraft, 650 of which were F-86s, in 1,872 aerial en-counters. Overall losses (conceivably not including missing in action or non-operational causes) were 335 planes and 120 pilots. Some Soviet sources quote a final score (not including Chinese and Korean victories) of some 1,300 for the loss of 345 MiGs. The Chinese and Korean air forces claimed a combined total of 231 victories at the cost of 271 of their number; the Americans reported the destruction of 954 aircraft, 827 of which were MiGs (or 893 resp. 841 as suggested by other sources), admitting the loss of 78 Sabres, 14 F-80s, and 18 F- 84s in air-to-air combat and 971 losses overall, mostly to groundfire and non-operational causes.

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DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

 

General Douglas MacArthur wades ashore in the Philippine Islands 1944. (photograph no. 531424; “General Douglas MacArthur wades ashore during initial landings at Leyte, Philippine Islands, 10/1944,” Record Group 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860–1982; U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD).

Douglas MacArthur was born into a military family in Little Rock, Arkansas, on 26 January 1880. His father, Arthur, had distinguished himself as a Union general in the Civil War. MacArthur attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he graduated first in his class (with the highest marks ever received by any student) in 1903. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant of engineers, and spent the years prior to World War I in a number of teaching and staff positions, including one in Asia with his father and another with President Theodore Roosevelt. He was attached to the General Staff in 1913, and participated in the Vera Cruz expedition the following year.

When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, MacArthur was with the General Staff. He assisted in organizing the multistate National Guard “Rainbow” Division and was its chief of staff when it was assigned to France in October 1917. He served as a general during the Aisne-Marne campaign, commanding the Eighty-fourth Brigade at Saint-Mihiel (September 1918) and the Meuse-Argonne offensive (October- November). MacArthur was one of the last commanders who believed in leading from the front, and he received 10 medals for valor and two Purple Hearts. He stayed with the occupation forces until his return home in April 1919.

He became one of the youngest superintendents of the Military Academy in June 1919, and initiated a number of reforms: codification of the Honor Code, revitalization of the curriculum, emphasis on the humanities and social sciences in addition to the “hard” sciences, and an attempt to end hazing. With these reforms, MacArthur tried to reflect the citizen-soldier nature of the cadets. His term ended in 1922, when he received orders for the Philippines. Three years later, he returned to the United States to command the Third and Fourth Corps areas in Baltimore and Atlanta, respectively. He faced the problems of a shrinking military budget, obsolescent equipment, decrepit facilities, and a low reenlistment rate. Three years later, in 1928, he was again in the Pacific as commander of the Department of the Philippines.

MacArthur held the position for two years; in November 1930 he was back home as army chief of staff. His experience in the Corps commands served him well in dealing with the even more stringent military budgets of the Great Depression. Though he focused on plans for industrial mobilization and manpower procurement, he became involved in political affairs as well. In 1932 he convinced President Herbert Hoover to send in troops to dislodge from Washington, D.C., the Bonus Army, a group of World War I veterans attempting to gain promised compensation from the government.

He was again in the Philippines in 1935, preparing that colony’s military for independence. When he was ordered home in 1937, before the job was completed, he chose instead to retire and stay in Manila. He was appointed field marshal in the Philippine Commonwealth Army. When war against Japan seemed imminent in 1941, MacArthur was recalled to active duty and appointed commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). As Philippine field marshal, MacArthur seemed to overestimate the abilities of his adopted army, while underestimating those of the Japanese. He learned the difference on 8 December 1941 when most of his air forces were destroyed on the ground by surprise Japanese attacks. He ordered a fighting withdrawal from Japanese forces landing on the island of Luzon, and spent the next months preparing defensive positions on the peninsula of Bataan and the island of Corregidor. He begged the U.S. government for reinforcements and supplies, but the decision in Washington was to write off the Philippines and defend Australia. MacArthur was ordered by President Franklin Roosevelt to evacuate the islands with his family and staff, which he did on 11 March 1942. U.S. and Filipino forces held out another month before their surrender to the Japanese.

In Australia, MacArthur was named supreme commander of the Southwest Pacific area. He secured the lines of communication by denying the Japanese a base at Port Moresby. With limited troops and support craft, he repulsed the southward Japanese advance across the island in the summer of 1942. He and Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), worked on strategy to carry the war to Japan’s home islands. With army troops and naval support, MacArthur would stage leapfrogging amphibious landings along the western Pacific islands to bypass or cut off large Japanese fortifications or troop concentrations. The strategy proved successful as American forces worked their way northwest up the Solomon Island chain, New Guinea, and to the Philippines. Nimitz meanwhile used Marines and naval forces to “island hop” across the Central Pacific while bypassing major Japanese strong points. Both commanders used the growing American superiority in aircraft and warships to neutralize Japanese bases.

MacArthur argued for an early invasion of the Philippines to fulfill his promise to the population that he would return. He overcame the Washington leaders who preferred an assault on Formosa, and ultimately Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. MacArthur and Nimitz carried out a joint operation in October 1944 against the island of Leyte. It was a daring plan, attacking the central section of the archipelago to split the defenders occupying the islands and prevent them from unifying. MacArthur was then able to separately defeat both Japanese forces. He spent the remainder of the war organizing the redeployment of his troops to areas outside his command and launching cleanup operations against the bypassed Philippine islands. On 2 September 1945 he presided over the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri.

Now a five-star general, MacArthur was appointed military governor of occupied Japan. He transferred his headquarters to Tokyo on 8 September and began his oversight of the political and economic reconstruction of Japan. As supreme commander of Allied Powers, he directed the writing of a new Japanese constitution. His term as governor can be described as one of the most efficient, honest, and fair of all military occupations in history. Much of Japan’s condition today can be attributed to the foundations MacArthur laid in the late 1940s.

On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces attacked across the 38th parallel into South Korea. The weak nature of the South Korean military and the inability to provide sufficient reinforcements left only the south-eastern corner of the country around the port city of Pusan uncaptured. MacArthur was named supreme commander of United Nations forces on 8 July. Because his immediate goal was to prevent the fall of Pusan, he brought in as many American troops as were available from occupation duty in Japan, and ordered American airpower to support the forces trapped in what came to be called the Pusan Perimeter. While the area was being held by General Walton Walker’s Eighth Army, MacArthur argued for newly arriving forces to be committed to a daring assault of Inchon, the harbor city serving the South Korean capital of Seoul on the peninsula’s west coast. Again, MacArthur’s influence and persuasiveness overcame Pentagon objections, and the landings on 15 September were an overwhelming success.

The United Nations expanded the scope of the conflict by permitting South Korean forces (closely supported by U.N. forces) to invade North Korea. The Communist Chinese government threatened intervention if their border was threatened, but MacArthur was certain they were bluffing; at Wake Island in mid-October, he assured President Harry Truman that the Chinese would not get involved. On 25–26 November 1950, the Chinese launched a massive assault that pushed U.N. forces south of the 38th parallel. Just as he had underestimated the Japanese in the late 1930s, he repeated his mistake in 1950. From the beginning, MacArthur and Truman could not agree on a strategy. Truman feared an escalating conflict that could become World War III, while MacArthur continued to believe in the goal of liberating North Korea. In addition to their personal differences, MacArthur began to publicly criticize Truman’s foreign policy; he felt his hands were tied because the president would not let him increase air operations, blockade Chinese ports, deploy Nationalist Chinese forces from Formosa, or possibly use nuclear weapons. Truman began to depend on the advice of Field Commander General Matthew Ridgeway, and MacArthur’s continuing critical tone and public statements released against orders proved too much for the president. MacArthur was relieved of his command on charges of insubordination on 11 April 1951. He returned to an adoring public and talk of the presidency in 1952, but his increasingly aggressive statements soon turned the public against him. He retired to West Point where (as he informed Congress of an old ballad common at the academy) he, like other old soldiers, faded away.

References: Carver, Michael, ed., The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); Costello, John, The Pacific War, 1941–1945 (New York: Quill, 1982); Manchester, William, American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

William C. Westmoreland

(March 26, 1914 – July 18, 2005)

General William C. Westmoreland commanded the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from June 1964 to June 1968, and, as the officer in charge of most of the American military assets in Vietnam during that period, he became the principal strategist for the U.S. war effort. Born in South Carolina, he graduated in 1936 from West Point, where he had been commander of the Corps of Cadets. He had an outstanding combat record in World War II and the Korean War, held many important command and staff positions, and was superintendent of West Point when President Kennedy selected him to head MACV. He was an energetic and dedicated but conventional military leader. Despite his communist adversaries’ known skills for irregular warfare and political tactics, he designed an attrition strategy of large unit sweeps and aerial bombardment aimed at regular North Vietnamese and Vietcong units and intended to inflict more losses on his enemies than they could sustain. He requested and received ever-higher numbers of U.S. ground forces until the total exceeded 500,000. He employed these in “search and destroy” operations utilizing helicopter mobility and high-technology weaponry. He paid much less attention to pacification efforts.

Although Westmoreland’s approach inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and he made public claims of progress (often at Washington’s prompting), by the end of 1967 he had, in fact, achieved only a military stalemate, which became apparent in the Tet Offensive in early 1968. His forces in South Vietnam repulsed the surprise enemy attacks, but it was clear that the war was far from over, and its burden on Americans and Vietnamese would only continue. Some military historians have claimed that Westmoreland never received the freedom or resources from Washington he needed for success, but it was also evident that his troops were often just flailing about without any clear plan for victory. Consequently, Johnson turned down his request for 206,000 more troops after Tet and reassigned him as U.S. Army chief of staff. He was succeeded at MACV by his deputy commander, General Creighton Abrams. Westmoreland retired from the army in 1972 and published his memoir in 1976. A 1982 CBS News investigation claimed that he had knowingly misrepresented enemy troop strength to Washington prior to the Tet Offensive. He sued the network for libel, and the case was settled out of court in 1985 with both sides claiming victory.

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