Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba

Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba

R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov, Memorandum on Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba, 24 May 1962

Top Secret

Special Importance

One Copy

To the Chairman of the Defense Council

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev
In accordance with your instructions the Ministry of Defense proposes:
1. To deploy on the island of Cuba a Group of Soviet Forces comprising all branches of the Armed Forces, under a single integrated staff of the Group of Forces headed by a Commander in Chief of Soviet forces in Cuba.
2. To send to Cuba the 43rd Missile Division (commander of the division Major General [Igor] Statsenko) comprising five missile regiments:
—The 79th, 181st and 664th R-12 [SS-4] missile regiments with eight launchers each, in all 24 launchers.
—The 665th and 668th R-14 [SS-5] missile regiments with eight launchers each, in all 16 launchers.
—In all, 40 R-12 and R-14 launchers.
With the missile units to send 1.5 missiles and 1.5 warheads per each launcher (in all 60 missiles and 60 warheads), with one field missile technical base (PRTB) per regiment for equipping the warheads and rocket fuel in mobile tanks with 1.75 loadings per R-12 missile and 1.5 per R-14 missile at each launcher.
Deployment of the R-12 missiles is planned in the [illegible] variant with the use of SP-6. Prepared assembly-disassembly elements of the SP-6 for equipping the missile pads will be prepared at construction enterprises of the Ministry of Defense by 20 June and shipped together with the regiments. Upon arrival at the designated locations, personnel of the missile regiments will within ten days equip the launch positions by their own efforts, and will be ready to launch missiles.
For deployment of the missile units armed with R-14 missiles, construction on site will last about four months. This work can be handled by the personnel of the units, but it will be necessary to augment them with a group of 25 engineer-construction personnel and 100 construction personnel of basic specialties and up to 100 construction fitters from State Committees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for defense technology and radioelectronics.
For accomplishing the work it is necessary to send:
—16 complete sets of earth equipment for the R-14 produced by [the machine] industry in the current year;
—machinery and vehicles:

Mobile cranes (5 ton) —10

Bulldozers —20

Mobile graders —10

Excavators —10

Dump trucks —120

Cement mixers (GVSU) —6

Special technical equipment for [illegible] and testing apparatuses

—Basic materials

Cement —2,000 tons

Reinforced concrete —15,000 sq.

meters (not counting access roads)

Metal —2,000 tons

SP-6 sets —30

GR-2 Barracks —20

Prefabricated wooden houses —10

Cable, equipment and other materials.

Further accumulation of missile fuel, missiles, and warheads for the units is possible depending on the creation of reserve space and storage in Cuba, inasmuch as it would be possible to include in each missile regiment a third battalion with four launchers.

The staff of the Group and of the missile division can expediently be sent from the Soviet Union in the first days of July 1962 in two echelons: the 1st echelon (R-12 regiments) and the 2nd (R-14 regiments).
3. For air defense of the island of Cuba andprotection of the Group of Forces to send 2 antiaircraft
divisions, including in their composition 6 antiaircraft missile regiments (24 battalions), 6 technical battalions, one fighter air regiment with MiG-21 F-13 (three squadrons—40 aircraft), and two radar battalions.
With the divisions to ship 4 missiles per launcher, in all 576 [SAM] missiles.
To send the antiaircraft divisions: one in July, and one in August, 1962.
4. For defense of coasts and bases in the sectors of probable enemy attack on the island of Cuba to send one regiment of Sopka ["little volcano"] comprising three battalions (6 launchers) with three missiles per launcher
—on the coast in the vicinity of Havana, one regiment (4 launchers)
—on the coast in the vicinity of Banes, one battalion (2 launchers)
On the southern coast in the vicinity of Cienfuegos to locate one battalion (2 launchers), [already] planned for delivery to Cuba in 1962.
The Sopka complex is capable of destroying surface ships at a range of up to 80 km.
5. To send to Cuba as part of the Group of Forces:
—a brigade of missile patrol boats of the class Project 183-R, comprising two units with 6 patrol boats in each (in all 12 patrol boats), each armed with two P-15 [trans: NATO SS-N-2 Styx] missiles with a range up to 40 km.;
—a detachment of support ships comprising: 1 tanker, 2 dry cargo transports, and 4 repair afloat ships;
—fuel for missiles: fuel for the R-13 [trans: NATO SS-N-4 Sark] and P-15—70 tons, oxidizer for the R-13— 180 tons, oxidizer for the P-15—20 tons, kerosene for the S-2 and KSShCh [trans: probably NATO SA-N-1 Goa]— 60 tons;
—two combat sets of the P-15 missile (24 missiles) and one for the R-13 (21 missiles).
Shipment of the missile patrol boats Project 183-R class, the battalions of Sopka, technical equipment for the missile patrol boats and technical batteries for the Sopka battalions, and also the missiles, missile fuel, and other equipment for communications to be carried on ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.
Shipment of the warheads, in readiness state 4, will be handled by ships of the Navy.
6. To send as part of the Group of Forces in Cuba in July-August:
—Two regiments of FKR (16 launchers) with PRTB, with their missiles and 5 special [Trans: nuclear] warheads for each launcher. Range of the FKR is up to 180 km.;
—A mine-torpedo aviation regiment with IL-28 aircraft, comprising three squadrons (33 aircraft) with RAT-52 jet torpedoes (150 torpedoes), and air dropped mines (150 mines) for destruction of surface ships;
—An Mi-4 helicopter regiment, two squadrons, 33 helicopters;
—A separate communications [liaison] air squadron (two IL-14, five Li-2, four Yak-12, and two An-2 aircraft).
7. With the objective of combat security of our technical troops, to send to Cuba four separate motorized rifle regiments, with a tank battalion in each, at the expense of the 64th Guards Motorized Rifle Division in the Leningrad Military District, with an overall personnel strength of 7300. The regiments to be sent in June-July 1962.
8. Upon completion of the concentration of Soviet troops planned for Cuba, or in case of necessity, to send to Cuba on a friendly visit, tentatively in September:
A) A squadron of surface ships of the Navy under the command of Vice Admiral G.S. Abashvili (deputy commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet) comprising:
—two cruisers, Mikhail Kutuzov (Black Sea Fleet) and Sverdlov (Red Banner Baltic Fleet);
—two missile destroyers of the Project 57-bis class, the Boikii and Gnevny (Black Sea Fleet);
—two destroyers of the Project 76 class, the Skromnyi and Svedushchii (Northern Fleet);
Along with the squadron to send one refueling tanker. On the ships to send one full combat set of standard ammunition (including one combat set of KSShch missiles –24 missiles) and standard equipment.
Sailing time of the ships 15 days.
B) A squadron of submarines, comprising:
—18th Division of missile submarines of the Project 629 class [Trans: NATO Golf or G-class] (7 submarines each with 3 R-13 [SS-N-4] missiles with range of 540 km.);
—a brigade of torpedo submarines of Project 641 class [NATO: Foxtrot or F-class] (4 submarines with torpedo armament);
—two submarine tenders.
Sailing time for the submarines, 20-22 days.
If necessary, the squadrons can be sent separately. Time for preparation to depart, after 1 July, is 10 days.
Upon arrival of the squadrons in Cuba, they would be incorporated into the Group of Soviet Forces.
9. For rear area security of the Group of Forces in Cuba to send:
—three hospitals (200 beds each);
—one anti-epidemic sanitary detachment;
—seven warehouses (2 for food, 1 for general storage, 4 for fuel, including two for automotive and aviation fuel and two for liquid fuel for the Navy);
—one company for servicing a trans-shipping base;
—one field bakery factory;
Create reserves:
—in the Group—fuel and provisions for routine maintenance of the troops for three months;
—in the troops—mobile (fuel, ammunition, provisions) by established norms;
—for follow-up secure provisions for 25 days.
10. The overall number of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will be about 44,000 military personnel and 1300 workers and civilians. For transport of the troops and combat equipment in summertime a simultaneous lift of about 70-80 ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet of the USSR will be required.
11. To establish a staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba to command the Soviet troops. To form the staff of the Group convert the staff of the 49th Missile Army from Vinnitsa, which has a well qualified integrated apparatus with support and service elements.
To incorporate into the staff of the Group a naval section, an air force section, and an air defense section. The Commander in Chief of the Group to have four deputies—one for general matters, one for the Navy (VMF), one for Air Defense (PVO), and one for the Air Force (VVS).
12. The form of dress envisioned for the troops sent to Cuba, except for the Navy, is one set of civilian clothes and one tropical uniform (as for troops in the Turkestan Military District).
13. Food for the personnel of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will be arranged from the USSR.
14. Financial support will be paid on the same general basis as for other troops located abroad.
15. Measures for creation of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will proceed under the codename Anadyr.
We request your review.

[signature]

R. Malinovsky

[signature]

24 May 1962 M. Zakharov

Prepared in one copy

on seven pages, no draft
Attested Colonel General S.P. Ivanov
[signature]

. . . . . . . . . . .

[The memorandum translated above and dated 24 May 1962, was the first general plan for the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles to Cuba prepared by the General Staff, in response to a request by Khrushchev after a May 21 meeting of the Defense Council. It was discussed at a CPSU Presidium (Politburo) meeting on May 24 and unanimously approved; see the translation that follows of the only record of that meeting, and of a follow-on meeting of 25 May, both entered in a hasty scrawl by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff and Secretary of the Defense Council, on the back of the May 24 memorandum. As noted, the decision of the Presidium was to approve the planned deployment, subject to Castro’s agreement. After the Soviet delegation returned from Havana, another Presidium meeting was held on June 10, and finally approved the General Staff memorandum. This approval was also noted briefly by General Ivanov on the same back page of the original (and only) copy of the May 24 memorandum. In addition, on June 10 all members of the Presidium signed this original memorandum, writing across the first page on top of the text (not all of the signatures are legible, but it does indeed appear to be the entire membership of the Presidium).
Ivanov’s notations are not fully readable, not only because of illegibility, but also because General Volkogonov’s photocopy of the document from the General Staff Archive was askew and the right side of the page was not reproduced. This is, however, the only copy available at this time. It is translated below.
There also follows below a chart prepared by the General Staff, showing the organization of the Group of Forces as of June 20 and identifying the units designated to be sent. (Several of the unit members were subsequently changed to enhance security.) It is not known for whom the chart was prepared, probably the General Staff itself. It was made in only one copy and was found in the General Staff archive. It has previously been available, but only in the Institute of Military History 1994 study of the crisis, Na krayu propasti [On the Brink], published in only thirty copies.—R[aymond].G[arthoff].]
 
 
S.P. Ivanov, Untitled notes on the back of the May 24 Memorandum to Khrushchev
24.5.62
The question of aid to Cuba was discussed by the Presidium of the CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU. N.S. Khrushchev presented a report. Statements were made by Kozlov, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Voronov, Polyansky and all other members of the Presidium and [illegible] approval of the decision.
The Decision
1. The measures in Anadyr are approved entirely and unanimously. The document was approved subject to receiving agreement by F. Castro.
2. A commission is to be sent to [Castro, or Cuba; this copy of the text cut off] for negotiation. Comrade Biryuzov [Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, recently named commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces], Comrade Ivanov [Colonel General Semyon P. Ivanov, deputy chief of the General Staff and head of its Main Operations Directorate]
[illegible]
[Translator’s Note: R. Rashidov, head of the planned agricultural delegation chosen as cover, and A. Alekseyev, selected to be the new ambassador in Havana, were also named but are not indicated in the visible text available]
25.5.62 11:00 AM
1. N.S. Khrushchev [met with] Malinovsky, Gromyko, Andropov, Troyanovsky, Rashidov, Alekseyev [Translator’s Note: text partly missing on available copy, probably included Biryuzov and Ivanov, although by this time it had been decided Ivanov would remain in Moscow. Portion of text here was not readable.]
[signed:] S.P. Ivanov
[The sheet at this point bears a notation made after the original notes of the meeting on Many 24. It reads:] Executed in one copy, on seven pages, no draft.
Attested: Colonel General S.P. Ivanov [signature]
24.5.62
[A formal classification stamp by the Operations Directorate of the General Staff dated 26.5.62 gives the classification "Special Importance" and a record number 394-illegible]
[There then follows on the same page a third notation by General Ivanov entered on June 10:]
10.6.62 11:00 AM
Presidium of the CC CPSU meeting, with participation also of Gromyko, Malinovsky, [Zakharov], Yepishev, Biryuzov, and Chuikov [all deputy ministers of Defense].
Rashidov and Biryuzov reported [on their mission].
[Remainder of the notation, four lines of script, is truncated and illegible on the Volkogonov copy.]
[Translator’s Note: An account of this Presidium meeting, based on reading this same document in the General Staff archive, is provided by Aleksandr Fursenko, in Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, pp. 187-89. He also summarizes a presentation to that meeting by Malinovsky reading from the basic May 24 Anadyr plan which, as earlier noted, was then signed by all Presidium members and Party Secretaries present.]
 
 
Text of General Staff summary diagram of Anadyr, 20 June 1962:

Top Secret

Special Importance

In One Copy

Diagram

Of the Organization of the Group of Soviet Forces

for "Anadyr"

Commander of the

Group of Soviet Forces

General of the Army I.A. Pliyev

Staff Deputies
(133 pers.)
Lt. Gen. V.V. Akhindinov First-Deputy—Lt. Gen.
Sections Of Av. P.B. Dankevich
Operational DirectorateFor Naval Affairs--Vice
(22 pers.) Adm. G.S. Abashvili
Col. N.A. Ivanov For Air Defense—Lt.
Intelligence Gen Av. S.N. Grechko
(11 pers.) For the Air Forces--Col.
Communications Gen. Av. V.I. Davidkov
(11 pers.) For Special [nuclear]
Ballistics Armaments—[blank]
(6 pers.) For Combat Training--
Cartographic and Geodosy Maj. Gen. L.S. Garbuz
(9 pers.) For the Rear Services--
Meteorological Service Maj. Gen.N.R. Pilipenko
(8 pers.) Deputy—Maj. Gen.
Sixth Section [unidentified] Tech. Trps. A.A.
(4 pers.) Dement’ev
Personnel and Records
(7 pers.)
Eighth Section [unidentified]
(13 pers.)
Missile Forces (RV)
43rd Missile Division

665th Missile Regiment (R-14 with PRTB)

668th Missile Regiment (R-14 with PRTB)

79th Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB)

181st Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB)

664th Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB)

(Eight launchers per regiment)

Air Defense Forces (PVO)

11th Antiaircraft Division
16th Antiaircraft Regiment
276th Antiaircraft Regiment
500th Antiaircraft Regiment
4 battalions in each AA Regiment

[Trans: 6 launchers in each battalion]

Separate Radar Battalion

10th Antiaircraft Division

294th Antiaircraft Regiment

318th Antiaircraft Regiment

466th Antiaircraft Regiment

32nd Fighter Aviation Regiment

40 MiG-21s

Separate Radar Battalion

Air Forces (VVS)

561st FKR (Frontal Cruise Missile) Regiment
584th FKR Regiment

Each regiment with 8 launchers and PRTB

437th Separate Helicopter Regiment

33 Mi-4 helicopters

134 Separate Aviation Communications Squadron

11 aircraft

Ground Forces (SV)

302nd Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment
314th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment
400th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment
496th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment
Naval Forces (VMF)
Submarine Squadron

18th Missile Submarine Division

7 submarines

211th Submarine Brigade

4 submarines

Two submarine tenders (floating support bases)

Surface Ship Squadron

2 cruisers, 2 missile destroyers, 2 destroyers

Missile Patrol Boat Brigade

12 missile patrol boats (cutters)

Sopka Missile Regiment [coastal defense cruise missile]

6 launchers

Aviation Mine-Torpedo Regiment

33 IL-28 aircraft

[Trans: Includes 3 trainers]

Detachment of Support Ships

2 tankers

2 dry cargo ships

1 floating repair ship

Rear Services

Field Bakery Factory
Hospitals (3 at 200 beds each)
Sanitary-antiepidemological detachment
Company to service entry to the bases
Food storage stocks (2)
Warehouse
Missile and aviation fuel stations (2)
Fuel oil for the Navy (2)
Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff
Colonel General S.P. Ivanov [signature]
20 June 1962
 
 
Memorandum from R. Malinovsky to N.S. Khrushchev, 6 September 1962

Top Secret (Sovershenno sekretno)

Special Importance (Osoboi vazhnosti)

Sole Copy (ekz. edinstven.)

To the Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR, Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

I am reporting
I. On the Possibility of Reinforcing Cuba by Air.

1. About the transport by air of special warheads [spetsial=nye boevye chasti; nuclear warheads] for the Luna [FROG] and R-11M [SCUD-B] missiles. Tests have been conducted at the test range and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of special warheads for R-11M missiles, two on AN-8 aircraft, and four on AN-12 aircraft.

The alternatives for transport of warheads for the Luna missile are analogous to those for the R-11M.

The transport of special warheads by Tu-114 is not possible owing to the absence of a freight hatch and fasteners.

2. About the transport by air of R-11M and Luna missiles.

Practice loading, securing and transport of training R-11M and Luna missiles has been carried out on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft, with 2 Luna or 1 R-11M missiles on AN-8 or AN-12 aircraft.

3. The size of the freight hold and carrying-capacity of AN-8 (5-8 tons) and AN-12 (7-16 tons) do not permit air transport of launchers, special earth moving machines, and field missile-technical bases (PRTB) for the R-11M and Luna missiles.

The Tu-114 aircraft, notwithstanding its large loading capacity (up to 30 tons) and long range (up to 8,000 km.), is not suitable for transport of missile equipment as it is not adapted in a transport mode.

II. Proposals of the Ministry of Defense for Reinforcing

Forces of the Group in Cuba

In order to reinforce the Group of Forces in Cuba, send:

1) One squadron of IL-28 bombers, comprising 10-12 aircraft including delivery and countermeasures aircraft, with a mobile PRTB and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons;

[In Khrushchev’s handwriting on top of "II.1)" above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads [three words illegible] [signed] N.S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M missile brigade made up of three battalions (total: 1221 men, 18 R-11M missiles) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special warheads, which the PRTB is capable of storing;

3) Two-three battalions of Luna for inclusion in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba.

[Overwritten:] Three Luna battalions. N.S. Khrushchev 7.IX.62

Each Luna battalion will have two launchers and 102 men.

With the Luna battalions, send 8-12 missiles and8-12 special warheads.

For the preparation and custody of special warheads for the Luna missiles, send one PRTB (150 men).

The indicated squadron of IL-28s, one R-11M missile brigade with PRTB, and two-three Luna battalions with PRTB, and the missiles are to be sent to Cuba in the first half of October.

Atom bombs (6), special warheads for the R-11M missiles (18) and for the Luna missiles (8-12) are to be sent on the transport Indigirka on 15 September.

The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful firing tests of the S-75 anti-aircraft system against surface targets on level terrain. At distances of 24 kilometers, accuracy of plus or minus 100-120 meters was achieved.

The results of computer calculations indicate the possibility also of successful use against naval targets.

In order to fire against land or sea targets using S-75 complexes with the troops [in Cuba], small modifications in the missile guidance stations will be required by factory brigades together with some additional equipment prepared by industry.

 
Marshal of the Soviet Union R.

Malinovsky [signature]

6 September 1962

[Translator’s Note: A detailed two-page informational addendum provides specifications of the Luna and R-11M missiles (diameter, length, width, height, and weight); the full range of possible transport aircraft (range, loading capacity, doors and hatches) of the AN-8, AN-12, IL-18, Tu-104, Tu-114, and the not yet available larger AN-22 aircraft; and bomber aircraft (the Tu-95 [Bear], Mya-4 [Bison], Tu-16 [Badger], and IL-28 [Beagle] bombers), although none were suitable for transporting the rockets both for technical and political-strategic routing reasons. This informational annex was signed on the same date, 6 September 1962, by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. It is not translated here.]
 
 
Memorandum, R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov to Commander of Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba, 8 September 1962

Top Secret

Special Importance

Copy #1

Personally

To the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba

The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint defense against possible aggression toward the USSR and the Republic of Cuba.
A decision on employment of the Soviet Armed Forces in combat actions in order to repel aggression and reinstatement [of the situation] will be made by the Soviet Government.
1. The task of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba is not to permit an enemy landing on Cuban territory from the sea or from the air. The island of Cuba must be turned into an impenetrable fortress.
Forces and means: Soviet troops together with the Cuban Armed forces.
2. In carrying out this task, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces on the island of Cuba will be guided by the following considerations:
a) With Respect to Missile Forces
The missile forces, constituting the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow, to deal a nuclear missile strike on the most important targets in the United States of America (list of targets included in Attachment #1)
[Translator’s Note: This attachment was not included in the Volkogonov Papers].
Upon arrival of the missile division in Cuba, two R-12 [SS-4] regiments (539 th and 546th) and one R-14 [SS-5] regiment (564th) will deploy in the western region, and one R-12 regiment (the 514th) and one R-14 regiment (the 657th) in the central region of Cuba.
The missile units will deploy to the positional areas and take up their launch positions; for R-12 missiles, not later than [illegible] days; for the R-14 missiles with fixed launch facilities [illegible] period.
With the establishment of launchers on combat duty, [illegible—all?] regiments will maintain Readiness No. 4
[Translator’s Note: The lowest level of combat readiness, and the least provocative.].
b) With Respect to Air Defense (PVO) Forces
PVO forces of the Group will not permit incursion of foreign aircraft into the air space of the Republic of Cuba [illegible words] and strikes by enemy air against the Group, the most important administrative political [and industrial] centers, naval bases, ports [illegible]. Combat use of PVO forces will be activated by the Commander of the Group of Forces.
The PVO divisions will be deployed:
—12th Division [surface to air missiles]—the Western region of Cuban territory [illegible]
—27th Division [surface to air missiles]—the Eastern region of Cuban territory [illegible]
213th Fighter Air Division will be deployed at Santa Clara airfield.
After unloading in Cuba of the surface-to-air missiles and fighter aviation will be deployed [illegible] and organization of combat readiness.
c) With Respect to the Ground Forces
Ground forces troops will protect the missile and other technical troops and the Group command center, and be prepared to provide assistance to the Cuban Armed Fores in liquidating [illegible] enemy landings and counterrevolutionary groups on the territory of the Republic of Cuba
The independent motorized rifle regiments (OMSP) will deploy:
—The 74th OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the Western part of Cuba in readiness to protect the Missile Forces [trans: in the San Cristobal and Guanajay areas] and to operate in the sectors Havana and Pinar del Rio;
—The 43rd OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the vicinity of Santiago de las Vegas in readiness to protect the Command of the Group of Forces and to operate in the sectors Havana, Artemisa, Batabano, and Matanzas;
—The 146th OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the area Camajuani, Placetas, Sulu...[illegible], in readiness to protect the Missile Forces [Translator’s Note: in the Sagua la Grande and Remedios areas] and to operate in the sectors: Caibarien, Colon, Cienfeugos, Fomento;
—The 106th OMSP in the eastern part of Cuba in the vicinity of Holguin in readiness to operate in the sectors Banes, Victoria de las Tunas, Manzanillo, and Santiago de Cuba.
d) With Respect to the Navy
The Naval element of the Group must not permit combat ships and transports of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, and provide cover for our transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.
Missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, nuclear missile strikes on the most important coastal targets in the USA (List of targets in Attachment #1).
The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One detachment of the brigade of missile patrol boats should be located in the vicinity of Banes.
The battalions of Sopka [coastal defense cruise missiles] should be deployed on the coast:
—One battalion east of Havana in the region of Santa Cruz del Norte;
—One battalion southeast of Cienfuegos in the vicinity of Gavilan;
—One battalion northeast of Banes in the vicinity of Cape Mulas;
—One battalion on the island Piños [Isle of Pines] in the vicinity of Cape Buenavista.
The torpedo-mine air regiment [IL-28s] will deploy at the airfield San Julian Asiento, and plan and instruct in destroying combat ships and enemy landings from the sea.
e) With Respect to the Air Force
The squadron of IL-28 delivery aircraft will be based on Santa Clara airfield in readiness to operate in the directions of Havana, Guantanamo, and the Isle of Pines.
[Translator’s Note: This deployment was later changed to Holguin airfield]
The independent aviation engineering regiments [OAIP] (FKR) [cruise missiles] [trans. note – The OAIP designation was a cover; the real designation was FKR regiments] will deploy:
—231st OAIP—in the western region of Cuba, designated as the main means to fire on the coast in the northeastern and northern sectors, and as a secondary mission in the direction of the Isle of Pines.
—222nd OAIP—in the eastern part of the island. This regiment must be prepared, upon signal from the General Staff, in the main sector of the southeastern direction to strike the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. Secondary firing sectors in the northeastern and southwestern directions.
The fighter aviation regiment armed with MiG-21 F-13 aircraft is included as a PVO [air defense] division, but crews of all fighters will train also for operations in support of the Ground Forces and Navy.
3. Organize security and economy of missiles, warheads, and special technical equipment, and all combat equipment in the armament of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba.
4. Carry out daily cooperation and combat collaboration with the armed forces of the Republic of Cuba, and work together in instructing the personnel of the Cuban armed forces in maintaining the arms and combat equipment being transferred by the Soviet Union to the Republic of Cuba.
5. Deploy the rear units and offices and organize all-round material, technical, and medical support of the troops.

Rear area bases will be located in the regions as follows:

—Main Base—comprising: the 758 th command base, separate service companies, the 3 rd automotive

platoon, 784 th POL fuel station, the 860 th food supply depot, the 964 th warehouse, the 71 st bakery factory, the 176 th field technical medical detachment—Mariel, Artemisa, Guira de Melena, Rincon;

—Separate rear base—comprising: 782 nd POL station, 883 rd food supply depot, a detachment of the 964 th warehouse, [the 1st] field medical detachment, a detachment of the 71 st bakery factory—Caibarien, Camajuani, Placetas;

—Separate rear base—comprising: separate detachments of the 784 th POL station, the 883 rd food supply depot, the 964 th warehouse, [the 71 st bakery unit, and the 1st field medical detachment—Gibara, Holguin, Camasan.

Fuel stocks for the Navy will be:

Depot No. 4472—Mariel, a branch at Guanabacoa,

Depot No. 4465—vicinity of Banes.

Hospitals will be set up in the regions: Field hospitals No. 965 with blood transfusion unit—Guanajay; No. 121—Camajuani, Placetas; No. 50—Holguin.

The transport of material to be organized by troop transport means, and also do not use local rail or water transport.

6. The operational plan for the employment of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba should be worked out by 01 November 1962. [Translator’s Note: Date filled in by a different hand; probably omitted for security reasons or for later decision by a higher authority.]
Attachments:
1. List of targets for missile forces and missile submarines for working out flight missions—attached separately.
2. List of the order of battle of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba in 3 pages, r[ecord] r/t #164
3. List of launchers, missiles and nuclear warheads possessed by the Group of Forces, on 2 pages r[ecord] r/t #164.
[Translator’s Note: All the Attachments are missing.]
USSR Minister of Defense [signature]
Marshal of the Soviet Union

R. Malinovsky

Chief of the General Staff [signature]

Marshal of the Soviet Union

M. Zakharov

8 September 1962 [Translator’s Note: 8 September is written over the original version of "_____ July 1962," suggesting that this document was drafted in July]

No. 76438
Send in cipher
[Various illegible signatures dated July 9, and one noting it was read by General V.I. Davidkov on 3 October 1962]
Published in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 11, Winter 1998, pp. 254-261.

The October 1962 "maskirovka"

Regarding the shipment of nuclear warheads to Cuba, there has been an extensive discussion of this issue in the 1990s in both Russian and English accounts. There is a summary of this in my book _The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces 1945-2000_(Smithsonian: 2002).

The Russian accounts include various archival documents as well as personal accounts of participating Soviet officers including officers of the Object S nuclear custody unit. The nuclear warheads sent to Cuba totalled 158 and included 6 Model 407N free-fall bombs for the Il-28 bombers; 12 Model 901A4 warheads for the Luna tactical ballistic rockets; 36 warheads for the R-12 ballistic missiles; 24 warheads for the R-14 ballistic missiles; and 80 warheads for the FKR-1 Meteor cruise missiles.

There isn't much debate over whether the warheads were sent to Cuba; there has been some debate over command and control of the warheads during the crisis. See especially the Cold War History Bulletin.

Steven Zaloga

Teal Group Corp.